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Abstract
We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside
options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows
the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distri-
butions of outside options, which are required to derive from smooth and
bounded densities with large supports. Parties are assumed to have a veto
right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payo⁄ in any
event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that ine¢ cien-
cies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation. We also illustrate
how veto constraints di⁄er from ex post participation constraints in an ex-
tension of the model in which the size of the pie may depend on the parties￿
private information. The same insights apply to the bargaining between a
buyer and a seller privately informed of their valuations and to public good
problems in which agents are privately informed of their willingness to pay
for the public good.
1 Introduction
Private information is well known to be a source of ine¢ ciency in bargaining. For the
sake of illustration, consider a seller and a buyer bargaining over the transaction price
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1of an indivisible object. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that if the
valuations of the seller and the buyer are smoothly and independently distributed
and if it is not sure who values the object most, ine¢ ciencies must arise in any
bargaining game in which no outside money is given to the bargaining parties.
The strength of Myerson and Satterthwaite￿ s result is that it applies to any
bargaining game including protocols in which a broker could help improve the bar-
gaining outcome, as well as protocols allowing for several stages of bargaining. The
result is obtained by relying on the ￿so called￿revelation principle, which allows
to derive constraints that should be satis￿ed in any Nash-Bayes equilibrium of any
game (whether static or dynamic): these constraints are the ￿so called￿incentive
constraints and the interim participation constraints. As shown by Myerson and
Satterthwaite, these constraints together with the constraint that the bargaining
parties receive no outside money in expectation cannot be simultaneously satis￿ed,
unless there are ine¢ ciencies.
The ine¢ ciency result obtained by Myerson and Satterthwaite is a corner stone
of information economics because it illustrates simply the essential role of private
information in welfare analysis. The main weakness is that it does not extend to
the case of correlated types. Whenever types are correlated (and whatever the exact
shape of correlation), the works of CrØmer and McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and
Reny (1992) can be used to show that the ￿rst-best can be achieved even without
subsidies (in expectation) while satisfying the incentive constraints and the interim
participation constraints of the agents.
While the idea that correlation should help is sensible (because the report of
agent j can then be used to alleviate the incentive constraints of agent i, i 6= j),
the conclusion that ine¢ ciencies can be entirely eliminated when there is correlation
sounds unintuitive.
In this paper, we consider a bargaining problem between n parties who bargain
on the division of a pie of known size V and who are privately informed of their
outside options. We allow for any form of correlation in the distribution of outside
options, and we allow third parties to help reaching a better bargaining outcome.
Up to some re-labelling, the buyer/seller problem (￿ la Myerson-Satterhwaite) can
be cast into our framework as well as public good problems in which agents would
privately know their willingness to pay for the public good (see subsection 3.3).
We depart from the usual mechanism design approach by assuming that agents
(including third parties) can quit the mechanism, thereby enjoying their outside
option at any point in time until a complete agreement has been reached. We refer
2to such situations as non-binding bargaining protocols.
Our main result is that in non-binding bargaining protocols, ine¢ ciencies are
inevitable, as long as the distribution of outside options has a smooth and bounded
density with support [0;V ]
n.
The restriction to non-binding bargaining protocols imposes additional con-
straints on what can be achieved through Nash Bayes equilibria as compared to
the traditional mechanism design approach. We refer to these extra constraints as
the ex post veto constraints. These constraints include the familiar ex post partici-
pation constraints because agreements violating such constraints would be ex post
vetoed. They also include the constraint that the bargaining parties should receive
no subsidy ex post, as otherwise the third party would have to lose money in some
events and she would veto it. But, veto rights impose additional constraints, as they
also a⁄ect the incentive constraints: when considering a deviation, an agent takes
into account the fact that he can opt out if things turn out badly.1
It may be worth stressing that our ine¢ ciency result applies to virtually all
densities of interest, and not merely to densities that are nearly independent, as
otherwise (if ine¢ ciencies arose only for nearly independent distributions) our result
would follow from continuity considerations (as in Robert (1991) or Kosmopoulou
and Williams (1998)).2
From a technical viewpoint, our method of proof is di⁄erent from that of Myerson
and Satterthwaite. In the non-correlated case, interim transfers are determined up
to a constant by the allocation rule. The constant is then ￿xed by the participation
constraint of an extreme type, here the type with largest outside option. So proving
that ine¢ ciencies must arise in the non-correlated case amounts to proving that the
transfers so derived from the e¢ cient allocation rule must violate another constraint,
the budget-balancedness constraint. In the correlated case, this method is no longer
applicable because the same allocation rule can be obtained through di⁄erent interim
1A similar distinction between ex post participation and ex post veto constraints appears in
Matthews and Poslewaite (1989) who analyze in double auctions preceded by cheap talk communi-
cation the constraints that must apply to equilibrium outcomes. (See also Forges (1999) for similar
considerations in an interdependent value setup.)
2Indeed, the ex post veto constraints imply that the transfer received by agents cannot exceed
V , which guarantee that the space of admissible transfer and allocation rules is compact, hence the
continuity result (see Robert (1991) for related considerations in a context with limited liability
and/or risk aversion, and Kosmopoulou Williams (1998) in a context with limited liability and/or ex
post participation constraints). See also La⁄ont and Martimort (2000) who observe that transfers
should be bounded when agents can collude in reaction to the proposed mechanism.
3transfers. (The work of CrØmer-McLean o⁄ers a simple illustration of this.)
We prove our result by directly showing that, in non-binding bargaining proto-
cols, if e¢ ciency could be achieved, the incentive constraint not to pretend that one
has a higher outside option would force every agent i to receive the entire surplus
for himself, i.e V ￿
X
j6=i
wj where wj is the outside option of j. Of course, this is not
possible as it would violate the ex post no subsidy constraint when the outside op-
tions of all agents are low enough (thus showing by contradiction that ine¢ ciencies
must arise).
In Section 2 we present the bargaining setup and our main ine¢ ciency result
using direct truthful mechanisms. In subsection 3.1 we provide an intuition for the
result based on a speci￿c discretization of the type space. We show in subsection 3.2
how to apply the revelation principle, thereby proving that our ine¢ ciency result
applies to all non-binding bargaining protocols. In subsection 3.3 we show how to
apply our result to other economic situations including buyer/seller problems and
public good problems. In Section 4 we discuss the interpretation of the ex post veto
constraints, and contrast it with ex post participation constraints. While ine¢ ciency
would also prevail if instead of ex post veto constraints we had considered the ex
post participation constraints and the ex post no subsidy constraint, we highlight
that ex post veto constraints and ex post participation constraints have, in general,
di⁄erent welfare implications. This is illustrated through an extension of the model
in which the size of the pie may vary with the signals held by parties. In an example
in which parties are not allowed to pretend they have an outside option larger than
it is in reality and in which the entire surplus must be distributed between the
bargaining parties, we show that the ￿rst-best can be achieved when the sole ex
post participation constraints are required whereas ine¢ ciencies cannot be avoided
under the ex post veto scenario. In Section 5 we suggest several extensions and
avenues for future research. These include a more general treatment of pies whose
size may depend on the signals held by agents, the relaxation of the ex post no
subsidy constraint, and the analysis of the second-best.
2 The Ine¢ ciency Result
We consider the following bargaining problem. There is a pie of size V to be shared
between n + 1 parties i = 0;1:::n where party 0 is an intermediary who may help
other parties i = 1;:::n. Utilities are transferable between parties and we assume
4that each party i, i = 1;:::n, has an outside option wi where wi 2 [0;V ].3 That is,
if no agreement is reached, party i gets wi. The values of w = (w1;w2;:::wn) are
not commonly known. Party i (but not party j, j 6= i) knows the realization of wi.
We let g(w) denote the joint density of w on [0;V ]n. That is, we explicitly allow
for correlations in the distribution of outside options. We assume that the density
g(w) is bounded and positive on its support, and that g(w) is di⁄erentiable with
bounded derivative. That is, there exists a strictly positive scalars m and M such




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ M.
We are interested in bargaining situations in which all players keep a right to
veto any proposal and to leave the bargaining table. Speci￿cally, a non-binding
bargaining protocol is a (possibly multi-stage) game that generates proposals for
agreement and where each proposal for agreement is followed by a rati￿cation stage
in which every one of the parties has the option to veto the proposal and the option
to leave the bargaining table.4
The rati￿cation stage will generate two types of constraints:
(1) The assumption that each party i = 1;:::n may leave the bargaining table im-
plies that in equilibrium each party i should (ex post) get at least his outside option.
From a mechanism design perspective, this assumption should thus be associated
with the well-known ex post participation constraints. However, as we will illustrate
later on, this assumption will generate a stronger condition, because it allows for the
possibility that a party wi takes his outside option even after a deviation from the
assumed equilibrium strategy, thereby leading to a new formulation of the incentive
constraints.
(2) The assumption that the intermediary may leave the bargaining table at any
point in time implies that no outside money can be given to the bargaining parties
in any event. From a mechanism design perspective, this condition will generate
an ex post no subsidy constraint.5
Rather than analyzing all possible non-binding bargaining protocols, we will
follow a mechanism design approach and de￿ne below a class of direct truthful
mechanisms with veto rights. We will later on show, by applying the revelation
principle to the present context, that there is no loss of generality in restricting
3Larger outside options would clearly result in no agreement and thus there is no loss of gener-
ality in assuming that outside options can be no greater that the size of the pie.
4Transfers in case of disagreement should be 0 as any other transfer would be vetoed by at least
one party.
5This is sometimes referred to as ex post budget balancedness. Note that we make no require-
ment here as to whether the entire pie should be distributed to parties i = 1;:::n.
5attention to such mechanisms: if ine¢ ciencies must arise in any direct truthful
mechanism with veto rights, then they must also arise in any equilibrium of any
non-binding bargaining protocol.
Formally, a direct mechanism with veto rights consists of two stages: an an-
nouncement stage and a rati￿cation stage; and it is characterized by the functions
(￿;t1;:::tn) where ￿ : [0;V ]
n ! [0;1] and ti : [0;V ]
n ! R specify, as a function of the
announcements, a probability that a proposal is made, and transfers to be received
by each party, respectively.
Speci￿cally, in the announcement stage, each party i simultaneously makes an
announcement b wi 2 [0;V ]. This generates, conditional on the pro￿le of announce-
ment b w = (b w1;:::b wn), a probability ￿(b w) that a proposal for agreement is made,
and in the event a proposal is made, monetary transfers ti(b w1;:::b wn), i = 1;:::;n
to be received by player i in case the proposal is rati￿ed in the next stage.6 The
intermediary would then receive V ￿
Pn
i=1 ti(b w) in this event.
In case a proposal is made, the game moves to the rati￿cation stage in which
each party (including the intermediary) simultaneously decides whether to accept
or veto the proposal. In case all parties accept, the proposal is implemented, each
party i gets ti(b w) and the intermediary gets V ￿
Pn
i=1 ti(b w). In case no proposal has
been made, or one (or more) party vetoes the proposal, each party i gets his outside
option wi, and the intermediary gets 0. The key feature of the rati￿cation stage is
that a party with outside option wi can always secure a payo⁄ of wi whatever the
pro￿le b w of announcements made at the announcement stage by deciding to reject
the agreement at the rati￿cation stage. This will be referred to as the veto right
constraint. Similarly, the intermediary must make no losses leading to the ex post
no subsidy constraint.
We consider direct mechanisms of the above form in which, it is an equilibrium
to report the true private information at the announcement stage, and in which, in
equilibrium, proposals are not vetoed. Such direct mechanisms will be called direct
truthful mechanisms with veto rights.
In a direct truthful mechanism with veto rights, party i with type wi should
report b wi = wi, and for any w 2 [0;V ]
n such that ￿(w) > 0, the intermediary should
6We implicitly assume that ti(b w) is deterministic but this is without loss of generality for our
main result (see subsection 3.2).
6get at least 0, and party i should get at least wi, hence:
X
i
ti(w) ￿ V and (1)
ti(w1;:::wn) ￿ wi (2)
Constraint (1) will be referred to as the ex post no subsidy constraint. Observe
that we allow for situations in which the entire pie V is not fully distributed to
the agents, i.e.
P
i ti(w) < V . This allows us to cover applications in which the
intermediary may extract some surplus from o⁄ering a division of the pie.7
Constraint (2) is referred to as the ex post participation constraint in the litera-
ture. It guarantees that whatever the realization of w￿i, party i with type wi is sure
to get at least wi when she announces her true type b wi = wi.
But, the veto right of party i does not reduce to the ex post participation con-
straint (2). It also a⁄ects party i￿ s incentive constraints, since party i can always
exercise her outside option after pretending she is of type b wi if the transfer ti(b wi;w￿i)
turns out to be less than wi. Formally, let Ui(b wi;wi) denote the expected payo⁄ob-
tained by party i in the above game when party i￿ s outside option is wi, party i￿ s
announcement is b wi and party i expects other parties j, j 6= i to report truthfully
b wj = wj. We have that
Ui(b wi;wi) = Ew￿i fmax[ti(b wi;w￿i);wi]￿(b wi;w￿i) + wi(1 ￿ ￿(b wi;w￿i)) j wig (3)
The e⁄ect of veto rights is captured in max[ti(b wi;w￿i);wi]: in any circumstance
party i with type wi should get at least wi when she announces she is of type b wi.
The incentive constraints require that for all i = 1;:::n; wi 2 [0;V ] and b wi 2 [0;V ]
Ui(wi;wi) ￿ Ui(b wi;wi): (4)
We ask ourselves whether there can be a direct mechanism with veto rights
satisfying the above constraints (1)-(2)-(4) and at the same time results in an e¢ cient
outcome whatever the realizations w = (wi)i=n
i=1 of the outside options. That is,
￿(wi;w￿i) = 1 if
X
i
wi < V and




Our main result is that such a mechanism does not exist, thereby showing the
following impossibility result.
7Of course, our ine¢ ciency result holds a fortiori if we further impose that the surplus should
be entirely distributed, i.e.
P
i ti(w) = V .
7Theorem 1: Ine¢ ciencies must arise in any direct truthful mechanism
with veto rights.
As we will show in Section 3.2, a corollary of Theorem 1 is that the impossibility
result must hold for any non-binding bargaining protocol. An intuition for Theorem
1 appears in the next Section. Theorem 1 is formally proven in Appendix. We now
put Theorem 1 in perspective.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) considered a bargaining problem between a
seller and a buyer who are assumed to know their valuation of the good. Their
ine¢ ciency result assumes that valuations are independently distributed between
the seller and the buyer, the supports of valuations of the seller and the buyer
overlap, and the seller and buyer can receive no subsidy on average.
Our conclusion is similar to that of Myerson and Satterthwaite. Yet, our result
di⁄ers from that of Myerson and Satterthwaite in several respects. First, we allow
for correlations between agents￿types. Second, we assume that parties have veto
rights (in the buyer/seller problem, the seller should in any event get at least her
valuation and the buyer should get at least 0). Third, we impose an ex post rather
than ex ante no subsidy constraint.
In the setup studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite, if agents have no veto right,
budget must be balanced ex ante and the distributions of valuations are correlated
in a non-degenerate way, the ￿rst-best outcome can be achieved. This can be viewed
as a corollary of the works of CrØmer and McLean (1986-88) and McAfee and Reny
(1992). Their work focuses on the possibility of full rent extraction from a monopoly
interested in maximizing pro￿t, but it equally applies to the welfare maximization
problem. Basically, their construction allows in the correlated case to set each agent
(whatever his type) to his reservation utility while inducing an e¢ cient outcome.8
Their construction thus guarantees that e¢ ciency can be obtained in the correlated
case even without subsidies (on average), as long as agents have no option to quit
once they have voluntarily agreed to join the mechanism.
The full rent extraction result of CrØmer and McLean is somewhat puzzling
because it suggests that in the correlated case (which some people consider to be the
generic case, see however Neeman (2004) and Heifetz-Neeman (2006) who challenge
this view) private information should have no e⁄ect (since the outcome so obtained
is the same as the one with complete information).9
8The reservation utility is from the interim viewpoint in which agents know only their own type.
9One should be cautious about how to interpret the work of Neeman (2004). His basic idea is
8From this perspective, Theorem 1 shows that there is an e⁄ect of private infor-
mation even in the correlated case whenever agents can quit the mechanism at any
point in time
It should be noted that our result is distinct from the observation that in the
case of nearly independent distributions some ine¢ ciencies must arise if transfers are
bounded (see Robert (1991) and Kosmopoulou and Williams (1998)).10 In contrast,
our result applies to all distributions with bounded and smooth density, and not
merely to nearly independent distributions. The reason for our stronger result is
that the veto constraints put a lot of additional structure beyond the fact that
transfers must be bounded. It is this extra structure together with the no subsidy
requirement that allows us to derive Theorem 1.
In Theorem 1, we have assumed that g(￿) has full support on [0;V ]n.11 How-
ever, for those w such that
P
i wi > V , a disagreement is inevitable. So, in any
truthful mechanism with veto rights, we must have ￿(￿) = 0 on the set ￿d ￿
fw j
P
i wi > V g; and each party must be getting his outside option for that range
of signal pro￿les. It follows that our ine¢ ciency result does not rely on the speci￿-
cation of g(￿) on ￿d. In particular, if g(￿) = 0 on ￿d, Theorem 1 still holds, as long as
that it is restrictive to assume that the payo⁄ relevant-type of party i, here his outside option wi,
should also determine i￿ s belief about party j￿ s type, and a more satisfactory formulation should
include further determinants in i￿ s belief. A natural way to model this is to assume that party
i receices a signal ￿i in addition to wi where ￿i together with wi determines i￿ s belief about j￿ s
type (party i￿ s type should now be described as si = (wi;￿i)). As long as the correlation matrix
between all variables wi;￿i;wj;￿j has full rank, the insight of CrØmer and McLean applies, and the
full rent extraction result holds. We note that such an extension of the model would not invalidate
our ine¢ ciency result (because the arguments on i￿ s incentive constraints can be made for each
realization of ￿i, see Section 3 and appendix).
So Neeman￿ s challenge of the full rent extraction result not only depends on the fact that the
payo⁄-relevant part of party i￿ s type does not fully determine i￿ s belief, but also on a notion of
consistency of belief that implies some form of conditional independence (thus challenging the idea
that the full rank assumption should be thought of as a generic situation, see Heifetz- Neeman for
further elaboration).
10This is so because the solution to the mechanism design problem becomes then essentially
continuous with respect to the distribution of private information, and by Myerson-Satterthwaite
we know that ine¢ ciencies must arise in the independent case. The same conclusion arises in the
case of slightly risk averse agents.
11We have also assumed that g(￿) > m on its support. If there is perfect correlation in the
sense that all wj, j 6= i are determined by wi, the ￿rst-best can be achieved (any deviation can be
detected and one can choose to implement the oustide option alternative in such a case, thereby
deterring any deviation). If there is almost perfect correlation, the ￿rst-best can approximately be
obtained by simply ignoring those reports that correspond to non-typical types.
9g(￿) satis￿es the boundedness and smoothness conditions on fw j
P
i wi ￿ V g (see
the start of section for a formal de￿nition of boundedness and smoothness). In this
case, ine¢ ciencies must arise even though it is common knowledge that an agree-
ment is bene￿cial.12 The latter insight is a bit reminiscent of Akerlof￿ s (1970) lemon
example. Yet, the logic of the two results is quite di⁄erent as our model is one of
private values with multi-sided and correlated private information, whereas Akerlof
considers a model with one-sided private information and interdependent values.13
3 Insights
We ￿rst present a simple intuition for our ine¢ ciency result in the case where outside
options take their values on a discrete but ￿ne grid. We next show how to apply
the revelation principle to our setup. Finally, we show how the seller/buyer problem
studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite and the public good problem such as studied
by Clarke and Groves can be cast into our setup.
3.1 Ine¢ ciency in a Finite Grid
The veto right constraint, together with the ex post no subsidy constraint, imply
the following set of inequalities on transfers:14




Our approach consists in showing that incentive compatibility conditions require
that the second inequality binds, i.e.:




12Note that correlation accross types is important for this result. The assumption that g(w) ￿
g > 0 for all w 2 fw j
P
i wi ￿ V g and that g(w) = 0 for w 2 fw j
P
i wi > V g implies some
correlation accross types. Besides, if types were independently distributed, and if it were common
knowledge that an agreement is bene￿cial, then ine¢ ciencies could be avoided.
13Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) provide an interesting private (and correlated) value example
in which it is common knowledge that the provision of a public good is e¢ cient, and yet, no
mechanism with ￿xed limited liability permits to implement it when the number of agent is large
enough (the probability even tends to 0 as the number of agents tend to in￿nity). By contrast,
our result does not rely on the number of agents being large, and the limited liability constraint is
replaced by the veto constraint.
14The second inequalities follows from ti(w) +
P
j6=i tj(w) ￿ V and tj(w) ￿ wj for all j.
10That is, each party i must always get the residual surplus generated by the agreement
assuming that all other parties are set to their reservation utility (their outside option
payo⁄). Of course, this cannot be, as such transfer rules would result in the violation
of the ex post no subsidy constraint for quite a range of outside option pro￿les (think
of wj being close to 0 for every j; all transfers ti should then be close to V , leading
to a violation of the no subsidy constraint).
The main task (performed in appendix) consists in showing that incentive com-
patibility conditions lead to equality (6).
In this subsection, we show why this is true in the case of two players when the
distribution of outside options has full support over the discrete but ￿ne grid15
G = f(k1V=N;k2V=N);ki 2 f0;:::;Ngg;
where N should be thought of as being large. This case is not covered by our main
Theorem, but it will permit us to provide a simple intuition as to why our result
holds.
Let w1 = k1V=N and w2 = k2V=N. E¢ ciency requires that an agreement should
be reached whenever k1 + k2 ￿ N. We wish to show that in any such event,
t1(w1;w2) = V ￿ w2. (7)
When k1 = N and k2 = 0 (and more generally in any event where k1 +k2 = N),
player 1￿ s outside option w1 coincides with the residual surplus V ￿w2, so that there
are no other choices than setting the transfer t1 equal to V ￿ w2.
Now ￿x k0
1 ￿ N, and assume that for all k1 ￿ k0
1 and k2 ￿ N ￿ k1, equality (7)
holds. We will show below that equality (7) must also hold for all k1 ￿ k0
1 ￿ 1 and
k2 ￿ N ￿ k1, thereby concluding the argument.
Agent 1 with outside option w1 = (k0
1 ￿ 1)V=N could consider reporting b w1 =
k0
1V=N. For all realizations of w2 that fall strictly below V ￿ w1 (that is, for all
realizations k2 ￿ N ￿ k0
1), the induction hypothesis tells us that player 1 should
get V ￿ w2, which is in any case the maximum payo⁄ player 1 can hope to get.
15Matsuo (1989) considers a two-type formulation in the buyer/seller problem of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) with independent distributions of types across agents. He notes that in
contrast to Myerson and Satterthwaite e¢ ciency may sometimes be achieved even when it is
not known which alternative is socially e¢ cient. His result hinges not only on the fact that the
distribution of types takes his value on a discrete grid, but that the underlying grid is coarse (two
types). In a discrete but ￿ne grid, the same ine¢ cieny result as the one in Myerson-Satterthwaite
would arise.
11Now for the realizations of w2 that coincide with or exceed V ￿ w1 (that is, when
k2 ￿ N ￿k0
1 +1), player 1 cannot hope to get more than w1, whether an agreement
is proposed or not.
It follows that the announcement b w1 allows player 1 to extract all the residual
surplus, hence the only way to provide player 1 with incentives to report w1 truthfully
is to give him that surplus even when he announces w1, that is, to set the transfer
t1 equal to V ￿ w2 for all realizations of w2 below or equal to V ￿ w1.
This proof is rather simple, yet it does not easily extend to other forms of dis-
cretization nor to the case of distributions with smooth densities.16 In the appendix
we show how to deal with this.
3.2 Using the Revelation Principle
Let us see now why Theorem 1 applies not only to direct truthful mechanisms with
veto rights, but also to any non-binding bargaining protocol.
Consider any non-binding bargaining protocol, possibly allowing for multiple
stages k = 1; 2:::, and an equilibrium ￿ of the game associated with this protocol.
Denote by ￿i(wi) the strategy used by party i in equilibrium, when his outside option
is wi. Each strategy pro￿le (￿i(wi);￿￿i(w￿i)) induces a probability ￿
k(wi;w￿i) that
an agreement is proposed and rati￿ed in stage k, and, conditional on rati￿cation in
stage k, a distribution e t
k;wi;w￿i
i over transfers e tk
i. De￿ne ti(wi;w￿i) as the expected
stage 1 transfer to player i induced by this strategy pro￿le:
ti(wi;w￿i) = Ee t
1;wi;w￿i
i
We assume that delay is costly, so that if ￿ involves no e¢ ciency loss, it should specify
that an agreement is reached in stage 1 with probability one whenever
X
i
wi < V ,
and it should specify that bargaining stops with no agreement reached whenever
X
i
wi > V . Moreover, since the agreement should not be vetoed in equilibrium,
for all w such that
X
i
wi < V , all transfer realizations e t1
i in the support of e t
k;wi;w￿i
i
should be such that e t1
i ￿ wi, implying that:
ti(wi;w￿i) ￿ wi.
16A common feature between the proof in the simple case and the general proof, though, is that
we only use i￿ s incentive constraints to deviate upwards from b wi = wi to wi +" > wi. This feature
will be referred to in Section 4.




i ￿ V , yielding:
X
i
ti(wi;w￿i) ￿ V .
Now de￿ne Ui(b wi;wi) as in (3) (see Section 2), using the transfers ti(w) and the
probabilities ￿
1(w) :
Ui(b wi;wi) = Ew￿i
￿
max[ti(b wi;w￿i);wi]￿
1(b wi;w￿i) + wi(1 ￿ ￿
1(b wi;w￿i)) j wi
￿
We show below that the incentive constraints Ui(wi;wi) ￿ Ui(b wi;wi) must hold for
all wi, b wi.
Consider the strategy of party i that consists in following ￿i(b wi) during the ￿rst
stage, and to exercise the outside option if no agreement is proposed by the end of
this stage, or if the proposed agreement entails receiving a payment smaller than
wi. The expected payo⁄ associated with that strategy when party i is of type wi
and parties j; j 6= i follow ￿j(wj) is denoted ￿ Ui(b wi;wi), and it satis￿es:
￿ Ui(b wi;wi) ￿ E￿￿i;w￿i[max(e t
1;b wi;wi
i ;wi)￿
1(b wi;w￿i) + (1 ￿ ￿
1(b wi;w￿i))wi j wi]
Because strategies are in equilibrium, the deviations above must be deterred, which
implies that conditions ￿ Ui(wi;wi) ￿ ￿ Ui(b wi;wi) hold for all wi, b wi. Now observe
that Ui(wi;wi) = ￿ Ui(wi;wi),17 and that ￿ Ui(b wi;wi) ￿ Ui(b wi;wi).18 So the incentives
constraints Ui(wi;wi) ￿ Ui(b wi;wi) must hold for all wi, b wi. It follows that the
direct mechanism de￿ned by the transfer rules ti(w) must be an e¢ cient direct
truthful mechanism with veto rights. But, we have seen that no such mechanism
exists, thereby showing that no equilibrium of any non-binding bargaining protocol
whatsoever can induce an e¢ cient outcome.19
3.3 Other Applications
We now observe that our ine¢ ciency result equally applies to other well known
problems.
17This is because all transfer realizations e t1
i in the support of e t
k;wi;w￿i
i are such that e t1
i ￿ wi.
18This is because for any (wi;w￿i), E maxfe t
1;wi;w￿i
i ;wig ￿ maxfEe t
1;wi;w￿i
i ;wig.
19The above considerations allow us to conclude that ine¢ ciencies must occur in any equilibrium
of any game whether static or dynamic in which parties can quit the bargaining table at any point
in time. However, the set of feasible alternatives in a multi-stage framework should account for the
date at which the agreement is reached. Thus, the second-best analysis of a dynamic framework
may a priori di⁄er from the second-best analysis of static frameworks depending on how the cost
of delay is modelled.
13The seller/buyer problem: Agent 1, the seller, owns an object which he
considers selling to agent 2, the buyer. The seller￿ s valuation for the object is given
by vS; the buyer￿ s valuation for the object is given by vB. The seller knows his
valuation vS but not that of the buyer vB. Symmetrically, the buyer knows her
valuation vB, but not that of the seller vS. Agents also know that (vB;vS) is drawn
from a joint distribution with bounded and smooth density with support (0;v)2.
For this application, our result (Theorem 1) establishes that if the seller and the
buyer can receive no subsidy ex post (i.e. the sum of side-payments received by the
two agents can never exceed 0) e¢ ciency cannot be achieved whenever each agent
must get at least his reservation utility in any event (that is, in any event the seller
must get at least vS and the buyer must get at least 0).
To see formally how to apply Theorem 1, call pi(b v) the payment to agent i,
i = S;B (it may be negative) in exchange for a trade between the seller and the
buyer after the announcements b vB and b vS are made by the buyer and the seller,
respectively. Ex post veto rights mean that in any event the seller must receive at
least her valuation vS in case of transaction (that is, pS(b v) ￿ vS in case of trade)
and that the buyer must get at least 0 in any event (that is, vB + pB(b v) ￿ 0 in
case of trade). The ex post no subsidy constraint means that the sum of monetary
transfers received by the seller and the buyer cannot exceed 0 (pS + pB ￿ 0).
This trade problem can be cast into a bargaining problem with outside options,
where the size of the pie V , outside options and transfers are de￿ned as follows:
V = v, wS = vS, wB = v ￿ vB, tS(w) = pS(v) and tB(w) = ￿ v + pB(v). It is readily
veri￿ed that the ine¢ ciency result in the seller/buyer problem is equivalent to the
ine¢ ciency result in this bargaining with outside option problem.20
The public good problem: A representative must decide whether or not to
provide a public good. There are n agents i = 1;:::n. The cost of the public good is
C. Agent i values the public good at ￿i 2 (￿;￿). Each agent i knows the value of ￿i,
but not of ￿j, j 6= i. Everybody knows that (￿1;:::;￿n) is distributed according to a
joint distribution that has a bounded and smooth density with support (￿;￿)n, and
we assume that n￿ ￿￿C ￿ ￿￿￿. That is, the maximum surplus from the public good
20Indeed, wS +wB < V is equivalent to vS < vB; the no subsidy constraint tS(w)+tB(w) ￿ V is
equivalent to pS(v)+pB(v) ￿ 0; the ex post participation contraints tS(w) ￿ wS and tB(w) ￿ wB
are respectively equivalent to pS(v) ￿ vS and pB(v) + vB ￿ 0.
14does not exceed the uncertainty about any agent￿ s valuation for the public good.21
E¢ ciency would require to build the public project whenever
P
i ￿i > C. Besides,
we assume that the community cannot receive ex post subsidies (that is, the sum of
￿nancial payments made by the agents must be at least equal to the cost C of the
public good).22
Our analysis shows for this application that e¢ ciency cannot be achieved when-
ever agents have the right to veto the public project (thereby enjoying a reservation
utility of 0). As in the previous application, ine¢ ciency is inevitable even if the
distributions of willingness to pay are correlated and whatever the degree of corre-
lation.
To see more formally the connection to Theorem 1, let pi(b ￿) denote the payment
requested from agent i when the pro￿le of announcements isb ￿. The ex post veto right
means that an agent i with type ￿i will refuse to make any payment greater than
￿i. The no subsidy constraint means that for any b ￿ one should have
P
i pi(b ￿) ￿ C.
E¢ ciency means that the public good should be implemented whenever
P
i ￿i > C.
No mechanism permits the implementation of the e¢ cient decision rule whenever
(￿1;:::￿n) is distributed on (￿;￿)n where we assume that 0 < n￿ ￿￿C < ￿￿￿ and the
density is assumed to be smooth and bounded by a strictly positive number on its
support.
This can be seen as a corollary of Theorem 1 where we de￿ne the bargaining
problem V = n￿ ￿ C, with outside options wi = ￿ ￿ ￿i.
The transfers in the bargaining problem ti(b w) should be identi￿ed with ￿￿pi(b ￿),
and it is readily veri￿ed that the incentive constraints and veto right constraints
in the bargaining problem are identical to the incentive constraints and veto right
constraints in the public good problem, thereby establishing the ine¢ ciency in the
public good decision problem as a corollary of Theorem 1.
4 Ex post participation constraints versus ex post
veto constraints
In this Section we explore how the ex post veto constraints as modelled above relate
to the more familiar ex post participation constraints. We also discuss how the
21This re￿ ects the idea that a single agent￿ s lack of enthusiasm for the public project may
undermine the desirability of making the public project.
22We also assume that building the public good requires the consent of every agent.
15e¢ ciency analysis is a⁄ected by the choice of one or the other form of constraints.
Ex post participation constraints assert that a party i with outside option wi
should get at least wi in equilibrium whatever the realization of types wj of other
parties j; j 6= i. Thus, ti(wi;w￿i) ￿ wi, which is the same as (2) in Section 2. Note
that these constraints alone give no guarantee that party i should get at least wi
o⁄ the equilibrium path, i.e. after announcing b wi 6= wi. That is, with the usual
approach, whenever wi announces b wi his payo⁄ is:
Ui(b wi;wi) = Ew￿i fti(b wi;w￿i)￿(b wi;w￿i) + wi(1 ￿ ￿(b wi;w￿i)) j wig (8)
and not (3) as in Section 2. Ui(b wi;wi) takes this form because now announcing b wi
should be understood to mean that i follows fully the strategy of party i with type
b wi and not merely whenever this strategy gives no less than wi, party i￿ s true outside
option. This distinction is relevant whenever for a non-zero measure of w￿i (given
wi), there is a positive probability of agreement at (b wi;w￿i), i.e. ￿(b wi;w￿i) > 0,
and ti(b wi;w￿i) < wi.
Ex post participation constraints - we believe - can hardly be interpreted in
terms of quitting rights, as it seems hard to justify that quitting rights could only
be exerted on the equilibrium path.23
One alternative justi￿cation for ex post participation constraints is in terms of
no regret. Party i should feel no regret, after seeing the outcome of the mechanism,
for not having exerted his outside option before playing the game. Two objections
though might be raised against this justi￿cation. First, the no regret idea, while
appealing, cannot be derived from standard equilibrium constraints that individ-
ual strategies should satisfy: parties are comparing the outcome of the mechanism
to an outside option that is no longer available. Besides, if one is willing to rule
out the possibility that an agent feels regret about his decision to participate, why
not also rule out the possibility that the agent feels regret about the strategy that
he uses within the mechanism. The latter idea would lead to stronger notions of
implementation such as dominant strategy or posterior implementation (see Green
and La⁄ont (1987) for ￿rst introducing the idea of posterior implementation). So,
in our view the no regret approach should lead to consider stronger forms of im-
plementation (than the usual Nash Bayes implementation) together with ex post
participation constraints.
23This is in contrast with the approach we have followed, in which quitting rights can be exerted
on and o⁄ the equilibrium path.
16In spite of these issues concerning the interpretation of ex post participation
constraints, we now ask ourselves how our ine¢ ciency result (Theorem 1) is a⁄ected
by the choice of ex post participation constraints (i.e. where Ui(b wi;wi) should be ex-
pressed as (8)) or ex post veto constraints (i.e. where Ui(b wi;wi) should be expressed
as (3)). We shall make the following observations.
(i) Under the condition of Theorem 1 (i.e. , with a smooth and bounded distribu-
tion of types g(￿) that has full support on [0;V ]n) ine¢ ciency also prevails under the
ex post participation constraint scenario. This is despite the fact that the incentive
constraints are less stringent under the ex post participation constraint scenario.
(ii) We shall illustrate below however that under alternative assumptions, the two
types of constraints yield di⁄erent conclusions. If g(￿) does not have full support, or if
the pie V depends decreasingly on the outside options (and if additional constraints
prevail on the set of outside options a party with outside option wi can pretend to
be), e¢ ciency is achievable with ex post participation constraints but not with ex
post veto constraints.
Under the condition of Theorem 1, ine¢ ciency must prevail with the ex post
participation constraint approach. To see why, observe that our proof of Theorem 1
makes only use of the upward incentive constraints (i.e., party i with type wi should
not gain by pretending he is of type b wi > wi, see subsection 3.1 and Appendix). The
ex post participation constraint of party i with type b wi implies that ti(b wi;w￿i) ￿
b wi whenever ￿(b wi;w￿i) > 0. But, b wi > wi implies that max[ti(b wi;w￿i);wi] =
ti(b wi;w￿i) and thus (3) and (8) take the same form whenever b wi > wi.
When g(￿) does not have full support, the situation is di⁄erent because then the ex
post participation constraint of say b wi need not be satis￿ed if (b wi;w￿i) falls outside
the support of g(￿). This in turn opens the door to the possibility of punishment
(ti(b wi;w￿i) < 0) when (b wi;w￿i) falls outside the support of g(￿), which may facilitate
the incentive constraints (thereby inducing an e¢ cient outcome while preserving the
ex post participation constraints).
For the sake of illustration, suppose that the support of g(￿) coincides with the set
￿ = fw j
P
i wi ￿ V g and that g(￿) is bounded and smooth on its support. Consider
any transfer scheme such that for all i, (i) wi ! ti(wi;w￿i) is increasing in wi on ￿,
(ii) ti(wi;w￿i) ￿ wi on ￿, and such that (iii) ti(wi;w￿i) = ￿P for (wi;w￿i) = 2 ￿. It
is readily veri￿ed that when P is set su¢ ciently large, such a transfer scheme allows
to implement the e¢ cient allocation rule in the ex post participation scenario.24 By
24The monotonicity of ti ensures that deviating downwards is not pro￿table and upwards devi-
17contrast, with the veto right approach, ine¢ ciency still holds in this case (see the
discussion after Theorem 1).
To illustrate further the di⁄erence between ex post participation constraints and
ex post veto constraints, we now consider the following situation. The size of the pie
is not constant and it depends on the signals held by the various parties.25 There
are several applications one could think of with this feature. In a bargaining setup,
the pie can be thought of as the output of a joint production, and this output may
depend on characteristics of the parties. In a public good setup, the cost may depend
on the characteristics of the agents for example because the ￿nal implementation of
the public good will have to meet requirements that may be related to these speci￿c
characteristics.
Formally, we let V (wi;w￿i) denote the size of the pie when party i￿ s type is wi.
In the following example, we assume that V (:;:) is decreasing.26 We also assume
that the entire surplus V (wi;w￿i) must be distributed between the parties and that
the agents cannot pretend that they have an outside option that is larger than their
real outside option (they can only lie downwards).27 The fact that V is decreasing
(and that the entire surplus must be distributed) makes it attractive to pretend that
one has a low outside option. This, in turn, explains why the ex post participation
constraint approach and the ex post veto constraint approach are not equivalent,
and, as it turns out, e¢ ciency can be achieved with the former when it cannot be
achieved with the latter.
A simple example: There are two parties i = 1;2, (w1;w2) is uniformly
distributed on [0;1]2, and V (w1;w2) =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
1 if w1 > w￿ or w2 > w￿
V if w1 ￿ w￿ and w2 ￿ w￿ where V > 1
and w￿ < 1
2. Our assumption that the entire pie must be distributed between the
ations are deterred by the punishment P for P su¢ ciently large.
25In the next Section we suggest an extension of our model to the case where V may vary with
the types of the agents. We show that our ine¢ ciency result can be extended to such a framework
when either V is increasing or V does not vary too much with the types of agents. In this Section
we simply illustrate that when V is decreasing, the ex post participation constraints and the ex
post veto constraints may lead to di⁄erent predictions.
26One motivation for V being decreasing in the bargaining example may be that if one has a low
outside options one is more willing to exert e⁄ort internally (within the team) to increase the size
of the pie.
27A motivation for this may be that parties have to certify that they have at least the outside
option they pretend to have. See Green and La⁄ont (1986) for a ￿rst approach to mechanism
design with partially veri￿able information.
18two parties writes as:
t1(w1;w2) + t1(w1;w2) = V (w1;w2)
whenever ￿(w1;w2) > 0: We further consider direct truthful mechanisms in which
party i with type wi cannot pretend he is type b wi > wi (he can pretend he is type
b wi < wi).28
We shall make two claims:
Claim A: Suppose V > 2 ￿ w￿. Then the ￿rst-best cannot be achieved with
the ex post veto approach.
Claim B: Suppose that V < 2 ￿ w￿ +
(1￿2w￿)2
2w￿ : Then the ￿rst-best can be
achieved with the ex post participation constraint approach.
These claims have the following corollary:
Corollary: Whenever 2 ￿ w￿ +
(1￿2w￿)2
2w￿ > V > 2 ￿ w￿ the ￿rst-best can be
achieved with the ex post participation constraint approach, but not with the ex
post veto constraint approach.
We start with the proof of claim A.
Proof of claim A: Suppose the ￿rst-best can be achieved. There must exist
x < w￿ or y < w￿ such that Ew2[t1(x;w2) j w2 ￿ w￿] ￿ V
2 or Ew1[t2(w1;y) j w1 ￿
w￿] ￿ V
2 (as otherwise Ew1;w2[t1(w1;w2) + t2(w1;w2) j w1,w2 ￿ w￿] < V violating
the premise that t1(w1;w2) + t2(w1;w2) = V whenever w1,w2 ￿ w￿).
Suppose this holds for x, set z > w￿, and consider party 1 of type w1 = z. At
best, party 1 with type w1 gets 1 ￿ w2 when w2 ￿ 1 ￿ z and w1 otherwise. That is,
by telling the truth, party 1 with type w1 gets at most:
Z 1￿z
0





















Take now z = 1 ￿ w￿.29 (10) is larger than (9) whenever
V > 2 ￿ w
￿: (11)
28The restriction to direct truthful mechanisms is legitimate because our structure satis￿es the
Nested Range Condition of Green and La⁄ont (1986).
29This is the value of z that maximizes the di⁄erence (10)-(9).
19Thus, when (11) holds, the ￿rst-best cannot be achieved with the ex post veto con-
straint approach. Q. E. D.
We now turn to the proof of Claim B.
Proof of Claim B: Consider the e¢ cient allocation rule, i.e. ￿(w1;w2) = 1
when w1 + w2 ￿ 1 and ￿(w1;w2) = 0 when w1 + w2 > 1. De￿ne party 1￿ s transfer
for w = (w1;w2), w1 + w2 ￿ 1 as:
t1(w1;w2) =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
V=2 for w1 ￿ w￿ and w2 ￿ w￿
w1 for w1 ￿ w￿ and w2 > w￿
1 ￿ w2 for w1 > w￿ and w2 ￿ w￿
w1 +
1￿w1￿w2
2 for w1 > w￿ and w2 > w￿
and symmetrically for party 2￿ s transfer. Clearly, the ex post participation con-
straints are satis￿ed and t1(w1;w2) + t2(w1;w2) = V (w1;w2) for all w = (w1;w2),
w1 + w2 ￿ 1.
It remains to check the incentive constraints. For types w1 ￿ w￿, downward
incentive constraints are immediately satis￿ed. For types w1 > w￿, we just have to
check that party 1 prefers announcing his true type b w1 = w1 rather than b w1 = w￿



















It is easy to check that this condition holds for all w1 > w￿ if and only if it holds at




5 Extension and future directions
5.1 Pies of interdependent size
Following the example of Section 4, we now consider an extension of the model
where we allow the size of the pie to be a function of the signals received by the
30Indeed, at the limit, the inequality becomes
V
2
w￿ + w￿(1 ￿ 2w￿) ￿ w￿(1 ￿
w￿
2







which is equivalent to the desired condition.
20parties, thereby resulting in some form of interdependence. Formally, the pie is now
of size V (wi;w￿i). We assume that @V
@wi(w) < a < 1 and w is distributed according
to a smooth and bounded density g(￿) with support on ￿n
i=1[0;wi] where wi satis￿es
wi > V (wi;0).
Direct mechanisms with veto rights are de￿ned as in Section 2. Direct truthful
mechanisms are direct mechanisms with the additional requirement that in equi-
librium parties report their true types to the third party and proposed agreements
are rati￿ed.31 The incentive and ex post veto constraints take the same form as in
Section 2. The main change compared to the private value case lies in the writing
of the ex post no subsidy constraint, as now, one should have that
X
i
ti(w) ￿ V (w) (12)
whenever ￿(w) > 0. An agreement may be viewed as the decision to form a pro-
ductive team that delivers a monetary output of V (w). In this interpretation, ti(w)
is the monetary compensation or wage received by i to participate in the joint pro-




In the case where the pie has a constant size V , the condition (12) arises as before
due to the quitting right of the third party: in no event this third party should make
losses. With a pie of interdependent size, (12) arises as the requirement that the
third party should believe that she makes no loss given the equilibrium inference
that follows from the announcement. Since in equilibrium each party i reports his
true type b wi = wi, (12) follows.
It should be noted however that assuming that the third party gets to learn the
announcement b wi of each party i is not without loss of generality, as one could a
priori imagine that the announcements are made to a fourth party who would not
be the residual claimant and whose role would consist in transmitting information.
From this broader perspective, what is being disclosed to the third party should
itself be endogenized: it need not be the full reports of types, but only the transfers
that ought to be made to each party i.32
When the third party is su¢ ciently risk averse, it is not di¢ cult to see that the
best case for e¢ ciency is when the announced types are fully disclosed to the third
party (this is because under in￿nite risk aversion hiding some aspects of b w can only
31The assumption that reports are directly sent to the third party has a bite in our context with
pies of interdependent size. This will be discussed at length below.
32A similar observation appears in Forges (1999).
21make the acceptance of the third party worse), and thus (12) appears as a necessary
condition.
When the risk aversion of the third party is less extreme however, the treatment
of the quitting rights of the third party is more complex and it should be the subject
of further work.33 In this more general case (and no matter what the risk attitude
of the third party is), we note that one should have that for all w with ￿(w) > 0:
X
i
ti(w) ￿ V (13)




We refer to (12) as the uniform no subsidy constraints and to (13) as the weak
no subsidy constraint. We have:
Theorem 2: (i) Assume that V is non-decreasing in wi for all i. Then ine¢ -
ciencies must arise in equilibrium in any direct truthful mechanism with veto right
(in which the uniform no subsidy constraint applies). (ii) Whenever V does not vary
too much in its domain (i.e sup
w; w0
[V (w) ￿ V (w0)] is su¢ ciently small), ine¢ ciencies
must arise under the weak no subsidy constraint scenario.
5.2 Ex post no subsidy versus Ex ante no subsidy
We return to the case of pies with constant size. In our analysis, we have assumed
that parties could receive no subsidy ex post. One may wonder what happens if we
only require that the parties receive no subsidy ex ante. We wish to illustrate here
that for some distributions over outside options, e¢ ciency can be achieved while
satisfying the ex post veto constraints, if only the ex ante no subsidy constraint is
required.
To this end, we assume there are two parties i = 1;2, and we consider a distri-
bution over outside options de￿ned as follows.34 With probability p > 0, outside
options are distributed according to a density g0 with full support on [0;V ]2. With
probability 1 ￿ p, outside options are distributed uniformly on F = f(w1;V ￿
w1);w1 2 [0;V ]g. We construct below transfers that implement the e¢ cient out-
come.
33In the context of the simple example of Section 4, since the pie had to be entirely distributed,
the third party had to know whether wi < w￿ for i = 1;2 or not, which was enough to make claim
A.
34The example falls outside the class of distributions covered in Theorem 1. Yet, we conjecture
that a slight modi￿cation would allow us to provide an example falling in this class.
22Speci￿cally, we set
ti(w1;w2) = wi when w1 + w2 < V
and
ti(w1;w2) = wi + T(wi) when w1 + w2 = V
Intuitively, the idea is to subsidize agreement ex post by a substantial amount T(wi)
whenever the announcement falls on the frontier. When party i overstates his outside
option, and announces b wi > wi, he obtains a transfer equal to b wi instead of wi with
probability pPrg0fwj < V ￿ b wi j wig. However, with probability (1 ￿ p), he loses
the subsidy. So choosing the subsidy T(wi) so that
(1 ￿ p)T(wi) = pmax
b wi
(b wi ￿ wi)Prg0fwj < V ￿ b wi j wig (14)
ensures that party i has incentives to report his outside option truthfully.
Having de￿ned T(wi) for all wi, it remains to check whether ex ante, these
subsidies remain smaller than the expected surplus generated by the agreement. To
do that, it is su¢ cient to check that conditional on each wi, the expected subsidy
(1 ￿ p)T(wi) is smaller than half the expected surplus, that is,
(1 ￿ p)T(wi) ￿
1
2
pEg0(V ￿ wi ￿ wj j wi): (15)
It is easy to check that (14) and (15) are compatible for a class of distributions g0.
35
5.3 The Second-Best
We have seen in Section 2 that ine¢ ciencies are inevitable even if the distribution
of outside options exhibit correlation whenever parties can exert their veto right at
any point in time and the pie has constant size V . An interesting next step would
be to analyze the form of the second-best in such situations.
35For example, if g0(w1;w2) is proportional to w1w2, one obtains
(1 ￿ p)T(wi) =
p
2
max(b wi ￿ wi)



















24, we get the desired inequality.
23Abstracting from the additional constraints imposed by the veto rights of agents,
it should be mentioned that in the case of correlated types, it is not possible to infer
uniquely the expected transfers to be given to agents from the allocation rule. This
makes the analysis of the second-best much harder in the correlated case.
Abstracting from correlation, a few researchers have tried to characterize when
the second-best with interim participation constraints can be achieved with the more
demanding ex post participation constraints. Attempts along these lines include
Myerson and Satterthwaite￿ s original work and Gresik (1991). Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite observe in the buyer/seller problem that when valuations are uniformly
distributed on some interval, the second-best can be implemented using the split-the
di⁄erence mechanism (￿rst studied by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)),36 which
satis￿es the ex post participation constraints. Gresik (1991) extends this observation
to all distributions that are unimodal. The second-best with ex post participation
constraints is not known for more general distributions of types (still assumed to be
independent across agents).
Combining the two di¢ culties (plus the additional observation that ex post par-
ticipation constraints need not be equivalent to ex post veto constraints) makes it
very hard to characterize the second-best, and more work is required for that task.
In some special cases though, we may take advantage of existing results and the
observation that the second-best is independent of the distribution of types w s.t.
X
i
wi > V (see the discussion following Theorem 1) to characterize the second-best.
For the sake of illustration, assume that there are two parties i = 1;2 and
that conditional on w1 + w2 ￿ V outside options are uniformly distributed on
fw j w1 + w2 ￿ V g.37 Such a distribution allows for correlation as it makes no as-
sumption on the speci￿cation of the distribution on fw j w1 + w2 > V g. In partic-
ular, we may well have g(w1;w2) = 0 whenever w1 + w2 > V in which case it is
common knowledge that an agreement is bene￿cial.
We claim that the second-best can be implemented through a direct mechanism
with veto rights, which refer to as the Nash bargaining protocol,38 characterized by
36In this mechanism both the seller and the buyer quote a price; if the seller￿ s price is below the
buyer￿ s price, there is trade at a price that is equal to the average of the two quoted prices; there
is no trade otherwise.
37A similar argument can be made for situations in which conditional on w1 + w2 ￿ V , outside
options (w1;w2) are unimodally distributed so that Gresik￿ s analysis holds.
38This protocol is the analog of the split-the-di⁄erence mechanism in the buyer/seller problem.
24the probabilities
￿(b w1; b w2) = 1 if b w1 + b w2 ￿ V , and ￿(b w1; b w2) = 0 otherwise,
and by transfers
￿i(b w1; b w2) = b wi +
V ￿ b w1 ￿ b w2
2
=
V + b wi ￿ b wj
2
That is, a proposal is made if and only if the announcements are compatible with
the size of the pie V . Transfers are chosen so that each party i obtains, in addition
to b wi, half the surplus V ￿ b w1 ￿ b w2. Exploiting Myerson-Satterthwaite￿ s analysis,
we get:
Claim C: Suppose that conditional on w1 + w2 ￿ V , (w1;w2) is uniformly
distributed on f(w1;w2) j w1 + w2 ￿ V g. Then the second-best can be implemented
through the Nash bargaining protocol, and it leads to an agreement if and only if
w1 + w2 ￿ 3V
4 .
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2:
The di⁄erentiable case:
We start by showing Theorem 1 in the case where ti(w) is di⁄erentiable. We will
later show how to relax this assumption and how to generalize the proof to cover
Theorem 2.
26We ￿rst derive a condition on transfers implied by incentive compatibility condi-
tions. Party i should prefer reporting he is of type wi rather than of type b wi = wi+".
When he reports b wi (rather than wi), he gains ti(b wi;w￿i) ￿ ti(wi;w￿i) whenever
b wi+w￿i ￿ V , and he loses no more than ti(wi;w￿i)￿wi in events where wi+w￿i ￿ V
and b wi +w￿i > V . (In other events, there is no loss because he cannot expect more
than his outside option payo⁄.) Incentive compatibility conditions thus require that
Z
b wi+w￿i￿V






When b wi + w￿i > V , the surplus is at most equal to ". Since ti(w) ￿ wi cannot
exceed the surplus, the right hand side of (16) is comparable to "2. Dividing by "
on both sides and taking the limit of this comparison as " goes to 0 yields (thanks





(wi;w￿i)g(wi;w￿i)dw￿i ￿ 0: (17)







wj ￿ ti(wi;w￿i))g(wi;w￿i)dw￿i (18)
We will prove that Hi(wi) = 0 for all wi 2 (0;V ). Given that V ￿
P
j6=i wj ￿
ti(wi;w￿i) ￿ 0 is non-negative (we know from (5) that V ￿
P
j6=i wj is the maximum
transfer that party i can hope to get when each party j￿ s outside option is given by
wj), we will deduce that for all (wi;w￿i) such that wi + w￿i ￿ V :




































39The term corresponding to the variation of the domain of integration does not appear because
at the boundary the veto constraint together with the ex post no subsidy constraint imply that
for w such that
P
j wj = V , ti(wi;w￿i) = wi and thus V ￿
P
j6=i wj ￿ ti(wi;w￿i) = 0.
27But, note that
Hi(V ) = 0,
since when wi = V the domain of w￿i such that wi + w￿i ￿ V has measure 0.
Thus, when
@g
@wi(wi;w￿i) ￿ 0 for all wi 2 (0;V ), (19) allows us to conclude that
dHi(wi)
dwi ￿ 0 for all wi ￿ V: Since Hi(wi) is non-negative everywhere (by the no
ex post subsidy requirement) and since Hi(V ) = 0, we conclude that Hi(wi) = 0
everywhere, as desired.
In the general case where the variations of g may be arbitrary, observe that
the fact that g has a strictly positive lower bound on its support and that g varies
smoothly with wi guarantee that there must exist a constant a (possibly negative)




Given the non-negativeness of V ￿
P




Thus, Hi(V ) ￿ exp(a(V ￿ wi))Hi(wi). Since Hi(V ) = 0, and Hi(wi) ￿ 0, we
conclude that Hi(wi) = 0, as desired. Q. E. D.
The general case:
This case will cover both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 (ii), where variations of the
size of the pie are bounded by ". Also we will no longer restrict our attention to
di⁄erentiable transfer functions. We consider a direct truthful mechanism with veto
rights that is e¢ cient and that satis￿es the ex post no subsidy constraint, and we








We will prove that there exists a constant a independent of " such that
Hi(wi) ￿ a". (20)
For all (wi;w￿i) such that wi + w￿i ￿ V (wi;w￿i), the constraint ti(wi;w￿i) ￿ wi
must hold. Since V (wi;w￿i) ￿ ￿ V ￿ "; inequality (20) in turn imply a lower bound
on player i￿ s expected utility. Let S = ￿ V ￿
P
j wj denote an upperbound on total
28surplus. We have:





















g(wi;w￿i)Sdw ￿ "Pr(S 2 [0;"]) ￿ a"￿ V
Adding these inequalities for all players, and since
X
i








g(wi;w￿i)Sdw ￿ N"(Pr(S 2 [0;"]) + aV )
which is impossible for " small.
We now turn to the critical part of the proof, which consists in showing that
inequality (20) holds.
First observe that the ex post participation and the no subsidy constraints to-




wj ￿ ti(wi;w￿i) ￿ wi; (21)
which implies that Hi(wi) ￿ 0. We now use incentive compatibility constraints
to derive an upper bound on Hi(wi). Incentive compatibility requires that for all









b wi+w￿i>￿ V ￿"
wi+w￿i￿V (wi;w￿i)
g(wi;w￿i)dw￿i;
Since ￿ V ￿
P














wj ￿ ti(b wi;wj))dwj
+
Z






29Let ￿ = b wi ￿ wi. The last term is bounded by (" + ￿)Prf0 ￿ S ￿ " + ￿g, hence
it is below b(" + ￿)2 for some constant b independent of " and ￿. To bound the
￿rst term, Remember that there exist m > 0 and M such that m ￿ g(wi;w￿i) and
j
@g
@wi j￿ M, i = 1;2, hence we have:
g(wi;wj) ￿ g(b wi;wj)+ j g(wi;w￿i) ￿ g(b wi;w￿i) j
￿ g(b wi;wj)(1 + M￿=m):
We thus obtain:
Hi(wi) ￿ Hi(b wi)(1 +
M
m
￿) + b(" + ￿)
2
Let ￿ = max(M=m;b) and consider wi ￿ v ￿". We choose ￿ =
￿ V ￿"￿wi
N , where N is
set so that "=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ". We obtain the sequence of inequalities:
Hi(wi) ￿ Hi(wi + ￿)(1 + ￿￿) + ￿(" + ￿)
2
￿ Hi(wi + 2￿)(1 + ￿￿)
2 + ￿(" + ￿)
2(1 + (1 + ￿￿))
::: ￿ Hi(wi + n￿)(1 + ￿￿)

















As N gets large, the term ￿N(1 + ￿￿)N remains bounded (by V e￿V). Since the
inequalities hold for all N, Hi(wi) remains bounded above by ￿
(2")2
"=2 = 8￿", which
concludes the proof. Q. E. D.
The case where V is increasing (Theorem 2 (i)).








and show that we must have Hi(:) = 0. This will permit us to conclude as before.
Consider wi < wi and b wi 2 (wi;wi]. Incentive compatibility requires that for all









b wi+w￿i>V (b wi;w￿i)
wi+w￿i￿V (wi;w￿i)
g(wi;w￿i)dw￿i;
30Using this inequality, the de￿nition of Hi(:) and since V is increasing, we obtain:
Hi(wi) ￿
Z
b wi+w￿i￿V (b wi;w￿i)
g(wi;w￿i)(V (b wi;w￿i) ￿
X
j6=i
wj ￿ ti(b wi;wj))dwj
+
Z






Let ￿ = b wi￿wi. The last term is bounded by b(￿)2 for some constant b independent
￿. We use the same technique as before to bound g(wi;wj). The rest of the proof
is identical:40 we choose increments ￿ =
wi￿wi
N and obtain, Hi(wi) ￿ ￿￿[￿N(1 +
￿￿)N], which tends to 0 as ￿ tends to 0 (or N gets large), which concludes the
proof. Q. E. D.
Before proving Claim C, we state the following claim which constructs an equi-
librium of the Nash bargaining protocol. This claim can be seen as a corollary of
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983):
Claim D: Suppose that conditional on w1 + w2 ￿ V , (w1;w2) is uniformly
distributed on f(w1;w2) j w1 + w2 ￿ V g. Then the announcement strategies de￿ned








are in equilibrium. There is agreement when w1 + w2 ￿ 3V
4 . The outside option
alternative is implemented when w1 + w2 > 3V
4 .
For completeness, we will provide a brief proof of this claim shortly. Also it
will illustrate that Chatterjee and Samuelson￿ s analysis does not depend on the
speci￿cation of the distribution of over types for events where the best alternative is
the status quo (here the outside option). Let us see ￿rst how Claim D can be used
to show Claim C.
Proof of Claim C: Observe that
￿
(w1;w2) j w1 + w2 ￿ 3V
4
￿
is the domain of
agreement in the second-best problem in which outside options are uniformly dis-
tributed on [0;V ]2 and only the interim participation constraints together with the
Nash-Bayes incentive constraints and the ex ante budget-balancedness are required
(this follows from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), see their characterization on
pages 276-277):
This allows us to conclude that the Nash bargaining protocol implements the
second-best when parties have the right to veto the agreement at any point in time,
40The only di⁄erence is that now, " should be set equal to 0.
31and conditional on w1 +w2 ￿ V , outside options (w1;w2) are uniformly distributed
on f(w1;w2) j w1 + w2 ￿ V g.
To see this, suppose that this is not the second-best, so that there is a mechanism
that generates a strictly higher expected welfare when conditional on w1 +w2 ￿ V ,
outside options (w1;w2) are uniformly distributed on f(w1;w2) j w1 + w2 ￿ V g. We
could then also improve upon the second-best of Myerson-Satterthwaite when each
wi is independently and uniformly distributed on (0;V ) by considering a mechanism
stipulating the same transfers and allocations for b w = (b w1; b w2) with b w1+b w2 ￿ V and
no agreement with no transfer when b w1 + b w2 > V . This would obviously contradict
Myerson and Satterhwaite￿ s analysis.Q. E. D.
We now turn to the proof of Claim D.
Proof of Claim D: The expected gain of party 1 with type w1 when announcing
b w1 is
G(w1; b w1) =
Z
V ￿ b w1+a(w2)
2 >w2
max(w1;











We now check that it is optimal for party 1 to announce b w1 = a(w1). Given the form
of a(￿) it is readily veri￿ed that whenever the announcements are compatible, i.e.
a(w1)+a(w2) < V , we have that a(wi) > wi for i = 1;2, hence the Nash bargaining
share of each party i is above wi. This allows us to simplify the expression of
G(w1; b w1) when b w1 lies in a neighborhood of a(w1) into:
G(w1; b w1) =
Z
a(w2)<V ￿b w1















[(1=2)b(V ￿ b w1) ￿ b
0(V ￿ b w1)(b w1 ￿ w1)]
where b(w) = ￿3
8V + 3







= 0: Q: E: D:
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